So Nazari, who represents Kabul province, and almost all other female Afghan MPs banded together and proposed a resolution, asking parliament’s leadership to stop the discrimination. It was ignored.

Female lawmakers say that they are still largely excluded from the political process in Afghanistan, where widespread religious fundamentalism and deep-seated cultural conservatism still pose big challenges to women’s advancement.

“They discriminate against every single female MP,” says Nazari. “Most of the time, they suffocate our voices.”

Due to strong international pressure, Afghanistan has one of the highest percentages of female lawmakers in the world. The Afghan constitution mandates that two seats in every province be set aside for women, meaning that 64 of the 249 lawmakers, or more than a quarter, are female.

But many women MPs say that religious conservatives, who adhere to a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam, dominate the parliament. “Many of the MPs and especially the administrative personnel of the Lower House (parliament) have an undeserving respect for former Jihadi leaders,” says female MP Shinkai Karokhel, from Kabul province. “They can talk for a long time and whenever they want.”

Human Rights Watch estimates that 60 percent of MPs have ties to warlordism, and many have been associated with war crimes.

Many of these jihadi leaders use their position in government to try and push their austere interpretations of Islam, female MPs say. Recently, for instance, an Afghan television station aired a programme showing dancing and music. The next day, Islamists in parliament declared that the programme was un-Islamic and the channel should be shut down. The women were not given a chance to make a rebuttal.

“Most of the time women don’t even dare say a word about sensitive Islamic issues,” says MP Karokhel, “because they are afraid of being labelled as blasphemous.”

In some cases, notorious warlords who could not stand for parliamentary elections four years ago sent their wives to run in their place. “For example, one woman MP, from Daikundi province, is the wife of a former mujahedeen commander,” says MP Nazari. “Now she is working in favour of her Jihadi husband.”

Even being allowed to run for parliament is a significant hurdle. Females in Afghanistan cannot leave their house and work unless their fathers, brothers and husbands give them permission. In most cases, female MPs are working in parliament only because a male relative has allowed them to do so.

According to the Afghan religious leaders, the testimony of two women is equal to one man. Even some women have come to accept this, since to deny this would be to defy a tenet of Islam. “Women are more sensitive than men,” lawmaker Nazari explains. “This is what Islamic theology says, and we cannot oppose it.”

But she quickly adds, “We are trying to prove to the world’s men that we are not as emotional as they think.”

The female lawmakers’ difficulties pale in comparison to those faced by ordinary Afghan women, women’s rights activists say. The women of the Afghan parliament are educated and wealthy, with lenient husbands and fathers, whereas most Afghan women are mired in poverty and are forbidden from leaving the home. “In this category, women are not even considered human beings (by men),” says Hasina Saafi, director of the Afghan Women’s Education Center, an NGO.

The Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) released a study last week that found Afghanistan to be the second most unequal society in the world in terms of gender, ahead of only Sudan.

To address such problems, Nazari and some other MPs last year formed a political party DATE devoted to promoting women’s rights - the first of its kind here. She says the organisation, National Need, has more than 45,000 registered members, from throughout the country. Her party oversees programmes in some of the most conservative areas in the country, like the southern Helmand province.

The party holds seminars to raise awareness amongst community leaders of the plight of women and at times sends staffers into the villages to speak to women directly and hear their complaints.

But the party has its detractors. “They claim they are fighting for women’s rights, but it is just a symbolic gesture,” says lawmaker Karokhel. She says that the party mostly just holds meetings and seminars, and does very little to change the actual lives of women.

“I don’t think that there is a real political party of foundation that fights for women’s rights here (Afghanistan),” she adds.

Afghan activists extend this criticism to the government as a whole, and some say that there should be more emphasis on women in all government sectors. “Of the 18 ministries, there is only one (the Ministry of Women’s Affairs) that is allocated to women,” says NGO head Saafi. “If the government really wants to improve the condition of women, it should appoint one female deputy in each ministry to deal with women’s affairs, because men don’t understand the problems women face.”

But the biggest challenge to gender equality in government circles is the warlords of parliament, says activists and lawmakers.

“These people use Sharia and Islam as an instrument to weaken women’s rights,” says lawmaker Karokhel.

“In no country in the world can you find spiritual leaders holding such power over a parliament,” says Narzari.

“I want to ask the US to prevent warlords and jihadi leaders from running for office,” she continues. “Otherwise I’ll continue to be constantly intimidated.”

“Send us 30,000 scholars instead. Or 30,000 engineers. But don’t send more troops – it will just bring more violence.”

Ms. Barakzai is among the growing number of Afghans – especially in the Pashtun south – who oppose a troop increase here, posing what could be the biggest challenge to the Obama administration’s stabilization strategy.

“At least half the country is deeply suspicious of the new troops,” says Kabul-based political analyst Waheed Muzjda. “The US will have to wage an intense hearts-and-minds campaign to turn this situation around.”

The lack of public support could provide fertile recruiting ground for the Taliban and hinder US operations, Mr. Muzjda says.

After a year that saw the highest number of civilian and troop casualties since the war began in 2001, officials in Washington recently pledged to send 17,000 soldiers to stem the growing violence. The move has broad support among the American public – a recent ABC News/Washington Post poll found that 64 percent back the new deployments.

Much of the Afghan opposition comes from provinces dominated by the Pashtun ethnic group, which include areas that have seen the most fighting and where the new troops will be deployed. A group of 50 mostly Pashtun members of parliament recently formed a working group aimed at blocking the arrival of new troops and pushing for a bilateral military agreement between Kabul and Washington, which currently does not exist.

Pashtun support is crucial

Although any proposed legislation or motion condemning the troop increase would be purely symbolic – the Afghan government does not have direct say over the operations of Western forces – observers say that the development is an important gauge of public opinion in Pashtun areas.

Dozens of interviews with tribal elders, parliamentarians who are not part of the working group, and locals in Pashtun areas have revealed similar sentiments.

“I can’t find a single man in the entire province who is in favor of more troops,” says Awal Khan, a tribal leader from Logar province, just south of Kabul. “They don’t respect our tradition, culture, or religion.”

“The majority of my people disagree with this increase,” says Hanif Shah Hosseini, an MP from Khost province who is not part of the working group. “More troops won’t bring more security, just an increase in the fighting.”

US supporters targeted

Many cite civilian casualties and house raids as the main reason for their opposition. Recently in Logar, armed locals blocked the highway into Kabul for hours, in protest of a night raid where US forces killed one and detained three others. According to local reports, the nearly 2,000 protestors burned tires and chanted anti-US slogans.

n Kandahar Province, villagers recently placed the bodies of two children who were killed by mines in front a government office, shouting anti-Western slogans. They alleged that unexploded Canadian ordnance killed the children.

Many locals also fear the reprisals of the Taliban in areas where troops operate. Recently in Wardak Province, locals saw two boys practicing their fledgling English with American soldiers who were passing by. The Taliban later executed the children, accusing them of being spies.

Some feel that the US should focus its efforts solely on reconstruction and the building of Afghan security forces. “The Americans spend thousands of dollars every month on a single soldier,” says Khost MP Mr. Hosseini. “With this huge amount of money, they can train our soldiers more effectively.”

Others say that if the troops must come, they should coordinate with the Afghan government. “Without such coordination, I don’t think sending more troops will change anything,” says Kandahar tribal leader Agha Lalai Dastageri.

He adds that if troops were under the control of the Afghan government, they would be deployed near the Pakistani border and away from populated areas, diminishing the chance of civilian casualties. Many Afghans believe that the source of insecurity partly lies in Pakistan, where the leadership of the insurgency allegedly takes refuge, and that policing the border will improve security throughout Afghanistan.

American military officials say that although the goal is to eventually transfer all security responsibilities to Afghans, troops are still needed now for development and security. “Our intent is to use the troops to secure rural areas,” says Capt. Elizabeth Mathias, spokeswoman for US forces in Afghanistan. “The Afghans are showing great promise, but they need us here for now.”

Snowmelt ups urgency

The injection of forces still enjoys support outside the Pashtun belt. Other ethnic groups, such as the Tajiks and the Hezaras, who predominantly hail from the country’s relatively peaceful north and west, back the notion. “We need these troops to strengthen security in the unstable provinces,” says Mirwais Yassini, chair of the Afghan Parliament. “We also need them [to provide security] for the upcoming presidential elections.”

Support for more troops is higher in the non-Pashtun areas because residents there have experienced less violence, and because they may view US forces as a buffer between them and the Taliban, analysts say. The memory of the Taliban’s harsh rule is still fresh in many non-Pashtun communities, who suffered greatly during that time.

But winning support in the rural Pashtun villages, where the war is being fought, is crucial for the plan, analysts say. Development will be a key component to this war. Military planners intend to continue focusing on projects meant to boost economic activity, which they say will show locals the benefits of US presence in the region.

“A couple of months ago Arghasan district in Kandahar was controlled by insurgents,” says Kandahar provincial council member Hajji Qasim. “But ever since USAID started a road project there, the economic situation improved and the insurgency lost influence.”

Military officials say that such development projects can only succeed if they are accompanied by a corresponding troop increase, since insurgents often attack reconstruction teams.

Officials in Washington and Pashtun villagers agree on one thing: They expect the violence to increase this summer as the new forces attempt to root out insurgent strongholds.

“I know once the snows melt, things will start to get much worse,” Logar resident Nasar Ahmad says. “The fighting will be intense, and a lot of us villagers are talking about fleeing to Kabul.”

“We are worried our families will be caught in the middle,” he adds.

Kabul, Afghanistan - President Hamid Karzai’s declaration Saturday that Afghan presidential elections should be moved up to April or May has aggravated already tense political divisions in this increasingly unstable country.

The unpopular leader’s decree is at odds with the Independent Election Commission (IEC), which has set Aug. 20 as the date for the polls. The United States reiterated its support Saturday for the later date – a preference shared by other candidates, who say they need more time to plan a campaign.

Karzai’s presidential mandate legally ends in May, which could leave Afghanistan without a head of state for three months if polls were held in August. The president’s supporters say an earlier vote is necessary to avoid such a scenario. Critics say, however, that more than two months are needed to prepare for the elections.

“We are headed for a confrontation,” says Haroun Mir, head of the Afghanistan Center for Research and Policy Studies based in Kabul. “This could be the start of a crisis of legitimacy, which would be dangerous in a country mired in instability.”

According to the Afghan Constitution, elections must be held 30 to 60 days before May 22, when Karzai’s term expires, but the IEC declared that elections this spring would be impossible. Large parts of the south and east are not under government control, making voter registration and voting difficult. Insurgents, who do not view the Afghan government as legitimate, have vowed to disrupt the polls.

Washington will be deploying at least 17,000 troops to the country by August, whom officials hope will be able to provide security for the polls. But most of them will not arrive by May.

A statement Saturday from the US State Department said “that elections in August… [are] the best means to assure every Afghan citizen would be able to express his or her political preference in a secure environment.”

The government also lacks a funding mechanism for holding polls and relies primarily on international donors. IEC deputy chief Zakria Barakzai says that $223 million will be required. “Till now we have $100 million pledged, which means we need more time to procure funds.”

Karzai’s supporters defend the earlier date, saying it is in line with the Constitution, and that the country should have a strong head of state during the crucial summer months, when violence normally soars.

However, some analysts say that behind Karzai’s decree lies political maneuvering. A spring election disarms the other candidates and gives Karzai a natural advantage, says policy analyst Mr. Mir. “Karzai wants to have the advantage of an incumbent when he runs. No one else is ready for this election.”

Mir adds, “Moreover, [Karzai] is aware that after May he may not hold power, which would rob him of the incumbent’s advantage.”

Some potential candidates have yet to formally declare their intent to run, let alone plan a campaign, and a few leading ones who live abroad have not even moved back to Afghanistan. “This decision does not accord with the democratic rules of the game,” says leading contender Ashraf Ghani, a former finance minister under Karzai. “We are supposed to guarantee free and fair elections.”

The IEC has yet to announce whether it accepts Karzai’s decree. If the IEC insists on an August date, it is unclear whether it or the president would have a final say on the matter. There is also no agreed-upon mechanism to select a caretaker government for the summer months. This could create political instability, which would weaken an already frail Afghan government, analysts say.

Mir says that Karzai could use the pending uncertainty and confusion to his advantage. “He may be trying to strike a bargain with the opposition, where he will agree to an August date in return for being allowed to stay in power through the summer months.”

Karzai’s popularity has plummeted in recent months. Many Afghans accuse him of heading a corrupt and ineffective government. He also appears to be losing support in key international circles. Officials in Washington have made a number of very critical public statements, with President Barack Obama saying last year that Karzai should get “out of his bunker” and attend to his nation. Karzai, in turn, has lashed out against the US for causing civilian casualties and alienating Afghans.

Although Washington declines to publicly back a candidate, some in diplomatic circles say it has shifted allegiance away from Karzai. Other leading contenders who may have American backing include Mr. Ghani, the former finance minister and vocal Karzai critic; Ali Ahmed Jalali, the former interior minister under Karzai currently in the US; and Gul Agha Sherzai, a former warlord and governor of eastern Nangarhar Province, which the Americans have cited as a model province because of the steady pace of development there.

With rampant insecurity and a patronage system, campaigning here may consist solely of winning over powerbrokers such as tribal leaders and international backers. A recent poll by the US-based Asia Foundation found that nearly 65 percent of voters intended to follow the voting instructions of tribal leaders.

Given such a system, some observers and opposition candidates say the situation is tilted in Karzai’s favor. As president, Karzai has established a strong network with many of the country’s local powerbrokers, says Mir.

“If indeed elections are held in April,” he says, “Karzai is convinced he can win.”

Maydan Shahr, Afghanistan - The 3,000 new American troops who arrived in recent weeks in Logar and Wardak provinces, both of which border Kabul, face a formidable challenge: establishing control in areas with little government presence and where insurgents operate freely.

In Band-e-chak, for example, a district capital in Wardak, gun-toting Taliban fighters regularly come into town on their motorbikes to do some shopping. They buy their produce and go home, driving past government offices unmolested.

These provinces could be a key testing ground for the Obama administration’s Afghan strategy, which may include a surge of thousands of US forces countrywide.

“Policymakers in Washington will be watching the progress there closely,” says Habibullah Rafeh, political analyst with the Afghan Academy of Sciences. “If [the US] can turn things around there, they can create the momentum to turn around the whole war.”

The strategy in Logar and Wardak will be to push the insurgents out of their strongholds and eliminate their contact with locals, and to emphasize development and reconstruction, says Col. David Haight, commander of the newly arrived troops.

Insurgents’ expanding control

Unlike areas of the Afghan south, such as Kandahar, the provinces close to Kabul were free from a sizeable insurgent presence until the last couple of years. The deteriorating security here mirrors the trends of worsening violence nationwide over the past year, where record numbers of foreign soldiers and civilians were killed.

In Wardak Province, insurgents today control six out of nine districts, according to interviews with locals and government officials here. They also control four out of seven districts in Logar Province, locals say. Parallel governments exist in each of these districts, with the Afghan government nominally occupying the district capitals but allowing the Taliban to operate freely.

Residents of Band-e-chak, the capital of Chak district, say the local government made an agreement with the Taliban. “They leave each other alone, so there is no fighting between the two sides,” says Fazel Minallah. “Sometimes when officials from Kabul visit, the Taliban leave and the [district government] puts a bunch of police in the streets and everyone pretends there is no problem.”

One other Wardak district even lacks a Kabul-appointed governor, leaving only the Taliban administration.

Complex militant networks

In addition to dealing with corrupt and ineffective local governments, US forces will have to contend with a collection of insurgent forces with different tactics and ideologies.

In Logar Province, the Haqqani network is the dominant insurgent group, according to intelligence officials. This network has sympathies with Al Qaeda and is considered one of the most dangerous insurgent outfits. Authorities say it may have been behind the daring simultaneous attack on three government offices in Kabul last week, for example.

Here in Wardak, the rebel group Hizb-i-Islami controls two districts and the Taliban four. Hizb-i-Islami was a leading guerrilla force that fought against the Soviet invasion in the 1980s and maintains ties from that time.

The rebels’ ranks here are drawn mostly from the local population, unlike some other provinces where the Taliban imports fighters. “This could make it harder for the US to separate the insurgents from the population and isolate them,” says Waliullah Rahmani, an insurgency expert with the Kabul Center for Strategic Studies.

Like elsewhere, Wardak and Logar are home to a bewildering array for tribes, each carrying a complex history of rivalries and allegiances.

A group of tribes here, which locals call the Maidani, has historically supported Hizb-i-Islami and contributes fighters to its ranks. Other tribes have allegiances with the Taliban and still others support the Afghan government.

Locals wary of more foreign troops

Washington’s biggest challenge, however, may be winning the support of a local population that is wary of American troops. “I had a meeting with my constituents,” says Roshanak Wardak, a member of parliament from Wardak Province. “They were completely, 100 percent against the arrival of foreign troops.”

“People are worried that the injection of more troops will bring more civilian casualties,” says Muhammad Hazrat Janan, a member of Wardak’s provincial council.

“We don’t want more fighting here,” says Najibullah, a taxi driver. “When the Americans come, the Taliban attacks us.” The others in his car nod in agreement.

But already 3,000 troops have landed in these provinces. They belong to the Army’s 10th Mountain Division, which was slated for Iraq until being diverted to Afghanistan last September.

Colonel Haight says he recognizes the problem of local hostility. “You won’t be able to build trust overnight. It will take some time.”

“We need to push into the villages,” he adds. “We have to get out there and show the benefits of our presence.”

These benefits will include fostering development and better governance, he says, to go along with traditional combat operations.

“They got the groceries here,” he explains, referring to farm produce. “They can get it out of the ground, they just can’t get it to the market.”

The two provinces have few usable roads and related facilities.

US forces here plan to facilitate infrastructure development, which officials contend will lead to more economic opportunities for the locals.

“He who creates jobs is going to win this war,” says Haight. “The Taliban can’t create jobs, but if we can, it can make a real difference.”

In addition, the Americans plan to help build the capacity of Afghan government.

They are meeting regularly with Wardak’s governor Muhammad Halim Fedayee. “I have been focused on getting qualified staff and creating a transparent and accountable government,” Mr. Fedayee says. “If the Americans don’t continue this approach, we are all in trouble.”

Debate over arming Afghans

US officials are also backing the creation of an armed paramilitary force in Wardak known as the Afghan Protection Force. Village elders will nominate groups of young men, who will be vetted, trained, armed, and given a uniform by the Ministry of Interior. These groups will be tasked with providing neighborhood security – there are only 460 police officers for the more than half a million people there – and acting as a “holding force” in areas where insurgents are cleared out, according to Afghan officials.

While the plan is popular with locals who see the possibility of jobs in a province where they are scarce, many analysts say there are dangers in providing weapons to tribesmen in a region awash with arms and in a country with a history of civil war.

Government officials in Wardak, however, support the initiative. “The US should be helping support all local Afghan security forces, instead of sending in troops,” says provincial council member Mr. Janan.

The provincial council is an elected body that advises the provincial governor. As the Taliban increased its hold over Wardak, council members started to leave the province. Now, none of the nine members even live in Wardak – they’ve all relocated to Kabul.

“My family can’t stay there anymore,” Janan says. “We just sit and wait for the day that we can return.”

Jalalabad, Afghanistan - This week’s brazen assault in Kabul underscored a major security gap for Afghanistan: its porous 1,500-mile-long border with Pakistan’s tribal areas, where militants can plan attacks and take refuge.

Wednesday’s insurgents sent text messages to contacts in Pakistan before launching an attack on three government offices that left 28 people dead, Afghanistan’s intelligence chief told reporters. Previous high-profile attacks in the capital have also been blamed on militants based in Pakistan.

In recent months, however, the US and Pakistani militaries have begun cooperating to try to secure the border by sharing intelligence and coordinating offensives on either side of it.

“We’ve gone from almost a stalemate situation in the mountains to gaining an advantage we didn’t have before,” says Col. John Spiszer, the commander of US forces in the northeastern border areas.

For years, Afghan and Western officials have complained that the lack of coordination with Pakistan was undermining the war effort in Afghanistan. The problem became so grave in US eyes that President Obama appointed veteran diplomat Richard Holbrooke as special representative to both nations. He arrived in Kabul Thursday from Pakistan as part of a regional tour.

Afghan insurgents fighting near the border often cross into Pakistan when under US military pressure; Pakistani militants filter into Afghanistan to join the insurgency there. For years, weapons and insurgents have been able to slip through mountain defiles along the border with little difficulty.

“The US needs Pakistan to help block the border,” says Haroun Mir with the Kabul-based Afghan Center for Research and Policy Studies. “The initial signs say that the cooperation is working, but we should wait and see how it goes over the long term.”

“Without Pakistan’s military cooperation,” he adds, “it will be impossible to win this war.”

While American and Pakistani military officials began sharing information in 2007, only in the fall of 2008 did the militaries start collaborating on a closer level.

The rise of a common enemy – Taliban-linked insurgents are at war with the Afghan and Pakistani governments – pushed the two militaries to closer cooperation, analysts say. For example, TNSM, an extremist group led by Maulana Fazlullah in control of Pakistan’s Swat district, is also very active in the Afghan border provinces, according to US intelligence officers.

The cornerstone of the US and Pakistan’s new joint effort is a US military campaign launched last fall in the Afghan border region dubbed Operation Lionheart, which seeks to complement Pakistani military offensives in the Pakistani tribal districts of Bajaur and Mohmand.

The militaries coordinate their movements so that insurgent escape routes are cut off: Pakistan’s role is to block Afghan insurgents from fleeing into Bajaur, and US forces are to stop Pakistanis from escaping into the neighboring Afghan province of Kunar.

When US commanders receive word that the Pakistani Army is operating in a particular area, they send troops to the Afghan side of the border, Colonel Spiszer explains. ”At this point, this means [sending] a four-vehicle patrol, but it’s better than nothing.”

US forces also communicate often with their counterparts across the border, and field commanders on both sides meet to exchange information and discuss tactics.

Commanders are also reinforcing troop strength along the border. A new US battalion recently arrived in Kunar, part of a likely escalation of US forces here.

Over the past year, US forces helped initiate a recruiting drive for the Afghan Border Police (ABP). In Afghan provinces near Bajaur, the ranks of the ABP have almost tripled, according to US military officials.

While the winter months usually see a lull in fighting in Afghanistan, as guerrillas head to warmer climes in Pakistan, the tightened border may be keeping more fighters in the country. Insurgent-initiated attacks in Kunar more than doubled in January compared with the same period last year, says Sami Kovanen, a security analyst in Kabul.

In addition, most of the attacks failed to kill US troops, who have low casualty rates in Kunar despite the high levels of violence there. Spiszer suggests that guerrillas may be having a harder time bringing casualty-inducing heavy artillery into the country.

At the same time, tensions still exist between the allies. The CIA and Special Forces – which operate outside the US military command that is cooperating with Pakistani forces – have repeatedly fired missiles into Pakistani territory, an issue that inflames lawmakers and locals there.

Some US officials say Pakistan covertly supports certain militant groups that are active in Afghanistan. These groups are not at war with Islamabad and instead reserve their fire for American troops. Such groups include the Haqqani network, which has a strong presence in southeastern Afghanistan, and Lashkar-e-Taiba (blamed by India for the Mumbai attacks), which is very active in Kunar.

Military officials say that such tensions are primarily political and don’t affect combat operations.

Longstanding frictions also exist between Kabul and Islamabad. But officials say that the greater military cooperation on the border has brought the Afghan and Pakistani militaries closer together as well.

“Whereas the Afghan border police and the Pakistani [forces] once had significant disagreements, they are now sitting down and having tea together,” says Capt. Benjamin Brink, an officer involved in coordinating border activities. “They realized over the last year that there is a common foe.”

Kabul, Afghanistan - Insurgents attacked three government offices in Kabul on Wednesday, killing at least 26 and wounding nearly 60. The assault was one of the most complex and daring to take place in the Afghan capital since 2001.

Five armed militants stormed the Ministry of Justice building, in a crowded section of downtown, killing some workers and taking others hostage. Afghan security forces exchanged gunfire for hours before freeing the hostages and killing all of the insurgents. At the same time, suicide bombers assailed a government prison affairs office in the north of the city, while a gunman opened fire outside the education ministry before being killed by police.

The attacks come as the Obama administration is reviewing US strategy in Afghanistan. US special representative Richard Holbrooke is due to visit Kabul Thursday from Pakistan as part of a South Asian tour, and President Obama is expected to decide within days whether to send as many as 30,000 more troops to Afghanistan.

Major incidents like this will certainly affect the debate in Washington, says Waliullah Rahmani, an expert on the insurgency with the Kabul Center for Strategic Studies. “If the insurgents can continually strike at the heart of the heavily fortified capital,” he says, “it undermines Washington’s faith in the Afghan government to provide security and could push them to send many more troops.”

More high-profile assaults in Kabul

Wednesday’s attack is the latest in a series of high-profile assaults in Kabul. In January, a car bomb detonated near the German Embassy, killing civilians and US soldiers. Last July, a car bomb targeted the Indian Embassy, killing at least 50 people. Gunmen tried to assassinate President Hamid Karzai last spring and stormed a luxury hotel early last year. In most of these cases, the insurgents were able to circumvent tight security.

On Wednesday, the gunmen were carrying large amounts of weaponry – including knives, grenade launchers, Kalashnikovs, and suicide vests – according to Afghan security officials.

“It concerns me that the enemy is able to bring explosives into the city, despite the security,” says Interior Minister Mohammad Hanif Atmar.

While parts of the south and east of the country are not under Afghan control, Kabul has remained a government stronghold. The periodic attacks here are creating a sense of insecurity, analysts say, and pose a challenge to US strategy since the city already has a large concentration of security forces.

“These incidents are a psychological blow to the Afghan government and its allies,” says Mr. Rahmani, “since they create the impression that the Taliban and other groups are able to strike anywhere.”

Kabul Province saw a 43 percent increase in insurgent-initiated incidents over the past year, according to numbers compiled by Sami Kovanen, a security analyst.

The insurgents periodically unveil new tactics, says Rahmani. Most of Wednesday’s attackers adopted a new look, according to witnesses. Some were clean-shaven and wore Western-style clothes, unlike past attackers, who wore traditional Afghan clothing and sported beards.

Assaults in the capital are also becoming more complicated. Wednesday’s offensive involved at least eight insurgents in three different parts of the city, requiring considerable planning and coordination. “This is the hallmark of the Haqqani network,” says Rahmani, referring to the guerrilla network headed by Jalalhuddin Haqqani and thought to be close to Al Qaeda. “The Haqqani attacks tend to be complex and are growing ever more so.”

Officials blame the Haqqani network for most of the high-profile attacks in Kabul in the past year, such as the car bombing at the Indian Embassy. The group counts a number of foreign fighters among its ranks and is generally considered more extremist than the Taliban in their tactics and political outlook.

Nonetheless, the Taliban and the Haqqani network sometimes coordinate attacks, officials say. A Taliban spokesman took credit for Wednesday’s assault, saying that they were in retaliation for the Afghan government’s harsh treatment of prisoners. (The Haqqani network does not have a spokesman.)

Retaliation for prison abuse?

Two of the besieged sites – the Ministry of Justice and the government office that regulated prisons – oversee the penitentiary system. Afghanistan’s prisons house hundreds of captured Taliban and other insurgent members, many of whom allege that authorities torture them. In December, scores of Taliban prisoners sewed their mouths shut and went on a hunger strike to protest ill treatment. Some Taliban members claim to have been falsely imprisoned, and say they turned against the government only after experiencing abuse in the prisons.

Officials with the Afghan security services say that Taliban fighters exaggerate claims of abuse, and that harsh measures are sometimes necessary to extract valuable intelligence. “The Taliban are the ones who are brutal and indiscriminately kill civilians,” says Mr. Atmar, the Interior minister. “We are trying to do our job and protect people.”

Kabul, Afghanistan - In the war-torn countryside, a maiden finds her path blocked by a group of threatening men.

But a woman from a nearby village suddenly jumps between the men and their victim. The men laugh at this ordinary peasant’s attempt at a rescue.

Alas for them, this is no common peasant: It’s Feroza! The undercover cop saves the day with some back flips and well-placed karate moves – all without smudging her eyeliner.

It’s a scene from the movie “Najat,” a recent title in the growing catalog of Afghan films that questions everything from gender roles to political corruption. Some filmmakers are braving death threats to bring such issues to the big screen, and they hope to change the way Afghans think.

“I want to show that I am powerful,” says Saba Sahar, who directed the film and starred as Feroza. “I want to convince all Afghan women that they are powerful.”

Afghanistan has hundreds of small film companies, almost all of which started after the fall of the Taliban in 2001. Like Indian Bollywood films, they usually contain song-and-dance routines. Unlike Bollywood films, they often focus on war, deprivation, and loss. Many lack happy endings: One recent feature follows the travails of an Afghan in search of food. The movie closes after the protagonist dies of starvation.

Funding is a constant problem. The films are often crudely produced and they struggle to compete with their more polished Bollywood counterparts. But home-grown movies are popular outside Kabul, where most don’t understand the Hindi spoken in Bollywood pictures.

Policing by day, directing at night

Ms. Sahar, a favorite among rural housewives, says she hopes to raise awareness about the widespread corruption that plagues the country. Later in “Najat,” after another round of high-flying karate helps her nab a suspected kidnapping ring, Feroza delivers the captured men to her police chief for interrogation. When the men refuse to divulge their ringleader, the police begin torturing the suspects – not an uncommon practice here. When Feroza finds out, she becomes livid. “How dare you beat prisoners! We must follow the rule of law!” she insists. The police chief hangs his head in shame.

Sahar knows a thing or two about interrogations – when she’s not acting and making movies, she works as one of Afghanistan’s few female police officers.

Another of Kabul’s enterprising filmmakers, Asad Salahi, is also a police officer. A diminutive man with a large mustache and booming voice, Mr. Salahi runs a police checkpoint north of Kabul, checking for drug traffickers and insurgents.

He’s written some of his experiences into his upcoming feature, “The Hungry Wolf,” a tale about Afghanistan’s “land mafia” – powerful warlords with government connections who steal land and displace poor villagers. The sensitive subject is rarely discussed in the press out of fear of the warlords, but Salahi hopes that his movie, which is fictionalized but based on real events, will help expose the practice.

“We are trying to teach Afghans about their rights,” he says. “There is no democracy here. The government and police take advantage of the people all the time.”

Such films earn Salahi powerful enemies. The Taliban sent him death threats after his previous movie was critical of the insurgents. He’s already been told to stop producing “The Hungry Wolf.”

“I’m not scared,” he says, pointing to a bulge in his right pocket. “I have my pistol. Let them come for me.”

Hurdles didn’t end with Taliban

Afghan moviemaking dates back to Soviet-funded film schools and academies of the 1970s. While years of war and Taliban rule dispersed much of the film community, a few directors never left the country.

Said Rahim Saidi was one who stayed behind. He even made movies during the Taliban regime, when filmmaking was banned. His “Tears of Blood,” shot in the late 1990s, tells the story of jobless youths who turn to drugs. His cameraman hid the camera under a burqa and secretly shot the cast as they acted out scenes on Kabul’s streets.

“When the Taliban would come by, we would all scatter,” actor Basir Mujahed says. “I would hide the camera in a crate and pretend that I was a shoeshine boy.”

The Taliban captured and beat many of the crew, but Mr. Saidi managed to complete the film. In spite of the difficulties, he says that his love of cinema pushed him to continue making movies.

“I even ran secret training courses for filmmakers in my office, until one day the Taliban came and took everything, including the film and cameras,” he recalls.

Filmmakers complain that their troubles continue today, albeit in a different form. “There is no money to spend, no good cameras or film,” says Salahi. Like many other filmmakers here, he puts his own money into the films.

The Afghan government has also tried to clamp down on the industry. The Ministry of Culture, for example, recently asked moviemakers to submit their scripts for vetting.

“The Afghan government wants to keep film at a low level,” says Siddiq Barmak, director of the award-winning “Osama,” which portrays a young girl forced to dress as a boy to survive during the Taliban era. “They want us to make Bollywood-style films, but they don’t want anyone to put money into making social and political movies.”

Directors also say that they run up against cultural prejudices. “It’s very hard to find girls to act in my films,” says Sahar. “The culture doesn’t allow women to act.”

Some filmmakers even have to go to neighboring Tajikistan to find women. “But that’s why we make these movies,” Sahar adds. “It’s to change people’s minds.”

Kabul, Afghanistan - At times in 2008 Afghanistan eclipsed Iraq in levels of violence, and international attention is returning to the country for the first time since 2001. With the Obama administration planning a massive troop increase, Afghanistan and Pakistan look to be at the center of the administration’s foreign policy for 2009.

What is at stake?

In 2008, violence reached record levels across the country – there were 50 percent more insurgent attacks in the first seven months of 2008 than in the same period in 2007, according to Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR), a Kabul-based aid organization. Insurgents are “conservatively estimated to be active in over 35 percent of the country,” says Nic Lee of the Afghan NGO Safety Office, a Kabul-based nongovernmental organization. The Taliban and its allied movements effectively control large parts to the Pashtun-dominated south and east, including many districts close to Kabul. Nearly as many international troops have been killed in Afghanistan this year as in Iraq, despite the fact that almost twice as many soldiers are deployed in Iraq.

“I won’t say that things are all on the right track, especially in the south and east,” David McKiernan, the top commander in the country, told reporters earlier this year. “So the idea that it might get worse before it gets better is certainly a possibility.”

The international community can’t afford to fail in Afghanistan, says Haroun Mir of the Kabul-based Afghanistan Center for Research and Policy Studies. An international defeat would deliver a crucial blow to Western strategic interests – Washington would lose a foothold in a region where rival powers such as Iran wield growing influence, and its ability to strike at Islamic extremists such as Al Qaeda would be greatly diminished.

A defeat would also be a major setback for US coalition partner NATO, which has deployed outside Europe for the first time.

However, experts say that an outright military defeat is unlikely in 2009 or beyond. The international forces are too strong in numbers, funding, and technology to be defeated by Taliban guerrillas, says Habibullah Rafeh, a policy analyst with the Kabul-based Afghanistan Academy of Sciences. Instead, he says the real danger is the West remaining bogged down in a protracted military conflict that could last decades and cost billions.

Can the US turn things around?

The incoming Obama administration pledges to focus more attention on Afghanistan and Pakistan, which critics say were overshadowed by Iraq in recent years. As many as 20,000 additional troops may head to Afghanistan this year. Many of these troops will be deployed in provinces close to Kabul, which currently do not have a significant international presence and are largely under insurgent control.

Military officials say that the additional troops are needed to build a permanent presence in villages and towns. “It doesn’t help when [we] go into villages, hand out soccer balls, kill a few insurgents, and then go away,” says an officer with NATO forces, who requested anonymity when speaking about military strategy. Instead, he says troops need to hold the territory they have gained and initiate reconstruction projects so that the local population can see the benefits of their presence.

However, many observers say that the additional troops may not be enough to secure the country. The surge will at best bring the total force strength to nearly 90,000, which is still far short of the US presence in Iraq or the Soviet presence during the 1980s. In addition, although there has been a large troop increase over the past two years, violence has increased over the same period.

In December, Western officials announced a plan to arm tribes against the insurgents, recalling a strategy in Iraq that helped weaken Al Qaeda there. The move is highly controversial in Afghanistan, which has a history of civil war and clashing militias.

A more popular strategy among officials is negotiating with the insurgents to end the fighting. The first steps toward reconciliation were made in 2008 when the Afghan government approached former Taliban figures in hopes of sparking a dialogue with current insurgent leaders. Such meetings are expected to continue in 2009, and Washington has publicly backed talks with all but the most senior Taliban leaders.

Washington is also backing Kabul’s efforts to reconcile with lower-ranking insurgents. “You talk to … people who may have fought for local reasons, [such as] tribal reasons,” says Richard Boucher, assistant secretary of state for South Asian affairs. “There are a number of programs under way [that will] eat away at the support base for the Taliban.”

What is Pakistan’s role?

Western officials accuse some elements of the Pakistani military of supporting militants based on Pakistani soil who cross into Afghanistan and launch attacks. This has long been a source of tension between the two countries, but in recent years some militants allied with Al Qaeda have also launched a war against Pakistan. The result is that Islamabad follows a duel policy of cracking down on militants arrayed against the Pakistani state – which includes Al Qaeda – but covertly tolerating militants who restrict their fighting to Afghanistan, critics say.

Despite this, Washington and Islamabad’s shared war against Al Qaeda has brought the two closer together. American officials say increased pressure from their side as well as the rise of a civilian government in Islamabad have brought cooperation to an all-time high. The Pakistani and American militaries are now undertaking joint military operations along the Afghan-Pakistani border, for example.

However, if violence continues to worsen in 2009 and Pakistan is not seen to crack down on the Afghan insurgents, tensions between the two countries could rise again. In addition, US officials expect to continue the policy of airstrikes in Pakistani territory, which Pakistanis oppose. Finally, tensions between India and Pakistan could distract Islamabad from its fight against militants and hurt its relations with the West.

What’s ahead for the Afghan government?

Presidential elections are scheduled for the fall and could prove pivotal. Analyst Mr. Rafeh says that poor security conditions in many parts of the country may preclude elections and deal a major blow to Washington, which views elections as a benchmark of success.

The government is under fire from all sides for being corrupt and ineffective, and Hamid Karzai’s popularity has plunged as a result. Nonetheless, a lack of strong alternatives might give him an easy victory if elections do occur, albeit with a low voter turnout.

Eroding support for the central government and the poor security environment risk undermining the gains made in the post-Taliban era, which include the country’s first democratically elected government, and advances in the spread of education and healthcare.

What is NATO’s future in the country?

The 41 NATO countries involved in Afghanistan – who make up roughly 55,000 of the 70,000 troops in the country – have differing rules of operation. Some refuse to deploy to combat-intensive zones and others have already set withdrawal dates. “The international forces can’t fight the Taliban if they don’t have a unified command and outlook,” says Rafeh.

On the battlefield, some consolidation is already taking place. US and NATO forces now answer to a single commander, for example. For 2009, the international forces plan to put command of the volatile southern region permanently under the Americans, instead of the current arrangement of rotating leadership between NATO countries. Officials say this will make the military effort more streamlined and effective.

On the political level, observers expect progress to be slower. Many countries have to deal with their own internal politics, says Rafeh. It might be politically risky for Germany to send troops to the violent south when the majority of its population is antiwar.

The danger in this, US Defense Secretary Robert Gates warned nearly a year ago, is in NATO becoming “a two-tiered alliance of those willing to fight and those who are not.”

Kabul, Afghanistan - Evidence of fraud and poor security conditions are raising concerns that next fall’s presidential elections could be compromised.

With Afghans scheduled to go to the polls in less than a year, the country’s Independent Elections Commission (IEC) is in the midst of a massive voter registration drive that will continue until early February. Election officials are watching registration numbers closely because low registration could delay or derail the presidential polls.

The IEC is reporting high turnouts across the country since the drive began in October, despite insurgent threats to kill anyone who registers. Many parts of the south and east are under insurgent control.

But evidence is emerging that the registration numbers are inflated by illegal practices, such as registration of lists of “phantom voters” and those under legal voting age. Lawmakers and an elections watchdog allege that such violations are widespread and could undermine the vote’s fairness.

The allegations come at a time when the incoming Obama administration has pledged to increase America’s focus on Afghanistan. In addition to sending in thousands of additional troops in 2009, officials cite strengthening the fledgling democracy and building strong governance as key policy goals in the coming years.

A questionable or fraudulent election could weaken the Afghan government and its allies as well as strengthen the Taliban’s hand. “This would undermine the legitimacy of whoever is elected president next year,” says Habibullah Rafeh, policy analyst with the Afghan Academy of Sciences.

Allegations of fraud are backed by evidence of irregularities in various provinces. In northern Baghlan Province, for instance, some students below the legal voting age claim that election officials issued them registration cards. “A lot of us took cards, even though we were underage,” says area resident Habibullah Sherzai. Another resident, Kabiri, says, “I know many youths who got registration cards. Some of my friends even have two cards.”

In southeastern Paktia Province, election officials claim that almost twice as many women have registered than men – despite extreme conservativism that largely prevents women from venturing outside. Some residents in the provincial capital, Gardez, claim that, in certain cases, one person registered on behalf of others, a violation.

“In Naswan High School, some people took bribes from the provincial council to register lists of women voters,” says Mahera Ahmadzai, who heads Paktia’s Women’s Shura. She alleges that some of the women on these lists do not exist. Other Gardez residents claim that men are registering on behalf of multiple women and that underage girls are registering. Such registrations could be used by one individual to cast multiple votes.

IEC Deputy Chief Electoral Officer Zekra Barakzai says his organization has received similar reports from Paktia and elsewhere. “We are taking these incidents very seriously, and we are sending people to investigate,” he says.

According to the Free and Fair Election Foundation of Afghanistan, an Afghan-based NGO that observed the process, multiple registrations of a single person were seen in at least 40 percent of all centers during the most recently completed phase of the drive. In one case, investigators found that some 500 registration cards were issued to one person in Badghis Province.

Investigators also found men staffing female registration centers and election officials who were members of political parties.

Poor security also obstructs the process. According to interviews with local tribal elders and provincial officials, insurgents effectively control six of Wardak’s eight districts. “There are districts that I am 100 percent sure no government worker can go to,” says Roshanak Wardak, a member of parliament from Wardak Province. “But you are telling me that still so many people registered? I don’t believe it.”

The IEC claims that of the province’s 90 registration centers, 82 remained open during registration. But residents say that in the Pashtun districts, many centers never opened. “I went to staff the registration office just once,” says one election worker from the Syed Abad district of Wardak, who declined to be named for security reasons. “The rest of the time I stayed in my village, which is controlled by the Taliban.”

“The people … didn’t even come out of their houses, let alone register,” says Alam Gul, chief of the Shura Council. Mr. Gul says the district of 100,000 people is largely under Taliban control.

Provincial officials say that election teams rarely, if ever, ventured outside district capitals. “Nobody came to our village. Almost no one has new registration cards,” says a member of the Shura Council of Chakh district.

As a result, the two Hezara-dominated districts of Wardak comprise the bulk of new voters. The IEC does not release registration numbers on a district-by-district or ethnicity basis, but IEC spokesman Mr. Barakzai says that “the registration numbers in Pashtun districts are very low.”

Although some people who didn’t register this year may still hold valid registration cards from the previous presidential election, the factors that kept Pashtuns from registering could keep those who have cards from voting. If the results of Wardak and elsewhere are reproduced in Pashtun regions, there could be an ethnic imbalance, says Mr. Rafeh, the policy analyst.

Security concerns also threaten the elections. “If this [security] situation continues, elections will be postponed or canceled,” Rafeh says. Insurgents have kidnapped or killed a number of election workers in recent months. In some areas, they have posted threats to anyone who registers to vote.

According to the Constitution, elections must take place in the spring of 2009. But IEC officials have tentatively scheduled polls for the fall. “If … security … doesn’t allow elections, a state of emergency can be declared and the elections can be postponed even further,” adds Mr. Barakzai.

“This is not the type of election we want,” Roshanak Wardak, a member of parliament, says. “If you can’t guarantee our security, don’t expect us to come out and vote.”

Kabul, Afghanistan - The Afghan government and its allies are reconciling with moderates and isolating hard-liners in a bid to split the insurgency, Western and Afghan officials say.

The idea of wooing moderates has gained traction as violence in Afghanistan has reached record levels this year. The United States and NATO are reassessing their strategy amid a growing chorus of Western officials who say that the international effort here is failing.

“Some ministries have started a program to try to separate Al Qaeda and the Taliban,” says Ursala Rahmani, a former Taliban official who has been involved in talks with the government. Mr. Rahmani says that the Interior and Defense ministries are involved in the effort.

“We are trying to exploit the natural tensions that exist between Al Qaeda and those under Mullah Omar,” the fugitive leader of the Taliban, adds a senior intelligence officer with the international forces, who spoke on the condition of anonymity.

Some insurgent commanders may be closely aligned with Al Qaeda, which is waging an international, ideologically driven war against the West.

But Afghanistan experts say that most Afghan insurgents fight because of local grievances, including tribal rivalries, poor economic opportunities, and dissatisfaction with the Afghan government and international forces. Many experts say these insurgents have little interest in attacking sites in the West and restrict their concerns to Afghanistan.

Western officials dub these fighters “moderates,” even though many of them are just as religiously conservative as their Al Qaeda counterparts.

“Over the long term, I see reconciliation as one of the primary actions that will have to occur for there to be success,” says Carter Malkasian, who directs the Stability and Development program at CNA, a Washington-based think tank.

Two-pronged strategy

Such reconciliation is a key ingredient in the kind of counterinsugency strategy militaries have used for decades, including in Iraq. The strategy may take two approaches. First, it will focus on the low-ranking insurgent fighters who may be easier to reconcile with the government.

“We tend to talk about the Taliban, but there is ‘big T’ Taliban, that is Mullah Omar and the [others] who … swept through the country in the mid-’90s,” says Eric Edelman, the Pentagon’s senior policy official, told reporters in Washington recently. “There is what I call the ’small-T’ Taliban, which are Pashtun tribals who are not reconciled to the government and may be engaging in … activity kind of opportunistically.”

According to officials at the Afghan Social Outreach Program, part of an Afghan government initiative to strengthen local governance, a new body is being formed to reconcile such fighters with the government that will use the promise of government jobs and cash inducements. This body will replace an already existing government organization that many say is corrupt and ineffective.

The second approach will be to zsow divisions in the insurgency’s leadership and isolate elements close to Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda and the Taliban have differing strategies: Al Qaeda’s policy of global warfare has brought it into confrontation with the Pakistani government, while the Afghan Taliban are on good terms with Islamabad and restrict its fight to Afghanistan.

“Al Qaeda’s activities draw Pakistani military action, and this leads to natural tensions between them and the [Afghan] Taliban,” says the senior intelligence officer with the international forces.

There is evidence that such tensions have existed for some months. In February, Mullah Omar issued a statement saying, “We want to have legitimate relations with all countries in the world,” and expressing solidarity with Iran, a Shiite country viewed by the Sunni-extremist Al Qaeda as an enemy. The statement also indicated that the Taliban’s main purpose was to fight within Afghan borders.

In response, prominent Al Qaeda websites posted messages denouncing the “nationalist trend” and pro-Iranian orientation in the Taliban’s communiqués.

Psychological operations

The effort to widen such possible divisions may include so-called psychological operations. According to intelligence officers, international forces and the Afghan government plant fake e-mails on jihadi websites or circulate bogus letters in the insurgent community.

For instance, a few months ago, there appeared a letter signed by Jalaluddin Haqqani, who heads an insurgent network that is independent of Mullah Omar’s Taliban and very closely aligned with Al Qaeda. The letter denounced Mr. Omar as “ineffective, ignorant, and illiterate” and appealed to insurgents to follow Mr. Haqqani. Intelligence agents with the international forces suggest that the letter originated from the Afghan government or its allies as an attempt to inflame tensions between insurgent groups.

Some insurgent commanders might be more amenable to negotiations than others. The US government is also backing talks between Afghan officials and former Taliban figures. A first set of meetings was held in the fall in Mecca, under the auspices of the Saudi king. Although many attending the meeting were low-ranking former Taliban officials or people who have fallen out of favor with the current insurgent leadership, observers say that Kabul may be hoping to use these talks as a starting point for future direct negotiations with senior leadership.

Some who attended the Mecca meetings say that future meetings are being planned in places like Dubai, and both sides are looking into meeting regularly in the coming months.

Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who heads an insurgent network allied with the Taliban, may not be fighting for purely nationalist or other ideological reasons.

“Hekmatyar’s main concern is power, and he will do whatever it takes to get it back,” says Waliullah Rahmani of the Kabul Center for Strategic Studies, an independent think tank. Mr. Hekmatyar was one of the few warlords not offered a position in the post-Taliban government.

In the spring, Hekmatyar sent a letter to Afghan President Hamid Karzai, stating, “I have dedicated my whole life to struggle, but I am old.” The letter goes on to imply that Mr. Karzai should remove all foreign troops from urban centers. A similar message was sent in October.

According to Waheed Muzhda, a former Taliban official who has seen one of the letters and is familiar with the negotiation process, Hekmatyar may be interested in a senior government post.

Splitting the insurgency, however, may prove difficult. “Many of the Taliban’s financial resources come from Al Qaeda,” says analyst Mr. Rahmani. The Taliban may also lack sufficient incentive to split from Al Qaeda or negotiate with the Afghan government as long as they feel they are winning the war and their havens in Pakistan are not threatened.

“Omar and his followers have nothing to lose and everything to gain if they can hold out long enough for foreign forces to withdraw,” says Matthew DuPee, a researcher with the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, Calif.

But if the US can weaken the insurgency, it could force splits in insurgents’ ranks. “If you achieve a measure of military success, then you are in a position to negotiate with the warlords,” says Stephen Biddle, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. The US must also offer incentives, such as more autonomy on the local level and more resources, he adds.

“If your end game is negotiated settlement, then you need both sticks and carrots,” he says.

• Gordon Lubold contributed from Washington.